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UNION DISCIPLINE OF SUPERVISOR-MEMBERS WORKING
IN NONUNION SHOPS
INTRODUCTION

Supervisors, unlike their rank-and-file counterparts, I have no statutory right to organize and bargain collectively. 2 Supervisors, however,
may be members of a union. 3 In certain industries, it is not unusual to
find supervisors who are union members. 4 Jobs in the construction

industry, for example, are mobile and unpredictable; 5 a worker may
be a laborer one day and a supervisor the next.6 Such transitory
supervisors typically maintain union membership
in order to retain
7
accrued life insurance and pension benefits.
Supervisors who maintain membership may encounter problems of

divided loyalties when they act as employer representatives in collective bargaining and grievance adjustment. On one hand, union membership carries with it a responsibility to abide by union rules.8 On the

1. 29 U.S.C. §§ 152(3), 157 (1976).
2. 29 U.S.C. §§ 152(3), 157, 164(a) (1976); see Hanna Mining Co. v. District 2,
Marine Eng'rs Beneficial Ass'n, 382 U.S. 181, 188 (1965).
3. 29 U.S.C. § 164(a) (1976); Florida Power & Light Co. v. IBEW, Local 641,
417 U.S. 790, 808 (1974).
4. R. Gorman, Basic Text on Labor Law: Unionization and Collective Bargaining 689-90 (1976); Comment, Section 8(b)(1)(B) of the National Labor RelationsAct
and Union Discipline of Supervisor-Members After Writers Guild: Equipoise or
Imbalance?, 1978 S. Ill. U.L.J. 453, 456 [hereinafter cited as Union Discipline].
5. R. Gorman, supra note 4, at 690; Union Discipline,supra note 4, at 456; see
Local 926, Int'l Union of Operating Eng'rs v. Jones, 103 S. Ct. 1453, 1460 (1983).
6. Local 926, Int'l Union of Operating Eng'rs v. Jones, 103 S. Ct. 1453, 1460
(1983); R. Gorman, supra note 4, at 690; Union Discipline, supra note 4, at 456.
7. R. Gorman, supra note 4, at 690; Union Discipline,supra note 4, at 456; see
Florida Power & Light Co. v. IBEW, Local 641, 417 U.S. 790, 793 (1974); Local
636, United Ass'n of Journeymen & Apprentices of the Plumbing & Pipe Fitting
Indus. v. NLRB, 287 F.2d 354, 362 (D.C. Cir. 1961); Comment, Changing Interpretation of NLRA Section 8(b)(1)(B)-Union Disciplineof Supervisors in the Aftermath
of FloridaPower & Light, 10 J. Mar. J. Prac. & Proc. 117, 118 (1976) [hereinafter
cited as Changing Interpretation].Readmission to the union may be available to the
worker who resigns membership during his tenure as supervisor. This, however, may
be insufficient to protect previously accrued benefits because seniority could be lost.
See Union Discipline, supra note 4, at 456. Occasionally, the collective bargaining
agreement between the employer and union will require supervisors to become union
members. E.g., Florida Power & Light Co. v. IBEW, Local 641, 417 U.S. 790, 792
(1974); Toledo Locals 15-P & 272 of the Lithographers & Photoengravers Int'l
Union, 175 N.L.R.B. 1072, 1073 (1969), enforced, 437 F.2d 55 (6th Cir. 1971).
8. E.g., ABC v. Writers Guild, 437 U.S. 411, 415-16 (1978) (rules governing
membership activity during strike); Florida Power & Light Co. v. IBEW, Local 641,
417 U.S. 790, 796 (1974) (prohibition against crossing picket line); NLRB v. IBEW,
Local 323, 703 F.2d 501, 502 n.1 (11th Cir.) (prohibition against working for
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other, as the employer's representative, supervisors often must take
positions contrary to union interests. 9
These allegiances can collide when a union disciplines a supervisormember who has violated union rules while representing his em-

ployer. 10 Such union discipline can run afoul of section 8(b)(1)(B) of

the National Labor Relations Act (Act)" when the union's actions
amount to coercion of the employer in the selection of its collective
bargaining or grievance adjustment representative. 12 Section
8(b) (1)(B) has been construed to prohibit union discipline of a supervisor-member for conduct involving contract interpretation or grievance adjustment. 1 3 When the disciplining union represents or seeks to
represent the rank-and-file workers of the supervisor-member's employer, the coercive aspects of the discipline are evident. 14 When there

employer in difficulty with union), cert. denied, 104 S. Ct. 366 (1983); IBEW, Local
73, 231 N.L.R.B. 809, 810 n.6 (1977) (same), enforcement denied, 621 F.2d 1035
(9th Cir.), modified on other grounds, 714 F.2d 870 (9th Cir. 1980); see Changing
Interpretation, supra note 7, at 118.
9. See Changing Interpretation,supra note 7, at 118; Union Discipline, supra
note 4, at 455; see, e.g., Florida Power & Light Co. v. IBEW, Local 641, 417 U.S.
790, 796 (1974) (violating union rule against crossing picket line); Toledo Locals 15-P
& 272 of the Lithographers & Photoengravers Int'l Union, 175 N.L.R.B. 1072, 1074
(1969) (working with undermanned crew contrary to union interests), enforced, 437
F.2d 55 (6th Cir. 1971); San Francisco-Oakland Mailers' Union 18, 172 N.L.R.B.
2173, 2173 & n.3 (1968) (contract interpretation contrary to union interests).
10. R. Gorman, supra note 4, at 690; Union Discipline,supra note 4, at 455; see
Florida Power & Light Co. v. IBEW, Local 641, 417 U.S. 790, 804-05 (1974); see,
e.g., ABC v. Writers Guild, 437 U.S. 411, 430 (1978) (discipline of supervisormembers for crossing picket line adversely affects their performance of duties); San
Francisco-Oakland Mailers' Union 18, 172 N.L.R.B. 2173, 2174 (1968) (discipline of
supervisor-members for interpretation of contract adversely affects their performance of duties).
11. Ch. 120, § 101, 61 Stat. 136, 141 (1947) (codified at 29 U.S.C. § 158(b)(1)(B)
(1976)).
12. Id. The term "collective bargaining" is defined in § 8(d) of the Act as "the
performance of the mutual obligation of the employer and the representative of the
employees to meet at reasonable times and confer in good faith with respect to wages,
hours, and other terms and conditions of employment." 29 U.S.C. § 158(d) (1976).
"Grievance adjustment" has been defined as the resolution of complaints or grievances of employees as well as of problems that may arise during the supervisor's shift.
Local 322, Laborers' Int'l Union, 229 N.L.R.B. 949, 950-51 (1977).
13. See Local 453, Bhd. of Painters, 183 N.L.R.B. 187, 188-89 (1970); R. Gorman, supra note 4, at 691; Changing Interpretation,supra note 7, at 120; Union
Discipline, supra note 4, at 461; see, e.g., Houston Typographical Union 87, 182
N.L.R.B. 592, 595 (1970) (supervisor-member's failure to adhere to collective bargaining contract); San Francisco-Oakland Mailers' Union 18, 172 N.L.R.B. 2173,
2173 (1968) (supervisor-members' contract interpretation).
14. See ABC v. Writers Guild, 437 U.S. 411, 414, 435-36 (1978); Painters Dist.
Council 36, 259 N.L.R.B. 808, 811 (1981); R. Gorman, supra note 4, at 691-92. See
infra notes 65-68 and accompanying text.
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is no union-management relationship, however, the existence of coercion resulting from discipline is more difficult to detect. 15
The National Labor Relations Board (Board) has ruled that even
absent a union-management relationship, union discipline of a supervisor-member, because he is working for a nonunion employer, constitutes coercion. 16 Under these circumstances the supervisor-member
may be able to avoid discipline only by resigning from the supervisory
position. Union discipline, therefore, may deprive the employer of its
bargaining representative.' 7 Courts have disagreed over whether such
discipline contravenes section 8(b) (1)(B). I
This Note contends that union discipline of a supervisor-member
can amount to coercion, within the meaning of section 8(b) (1)(B),
only when two components are present: (1) discipline of particular
supervisory conduct, and (2) a union-management relationship. Part I
examines the types of supervisory conduct for which unions can discipline supervisor-members without being coercive. Part II discusses the
type of union-management relationship that must exist for any discipline to be coercive. Part III demonstrates that section 8(b)(1)(B) was
not intended to resolve the divided loyalty problem. Other sections of
the Act were enacted for this purpose. This Note concludes that when
the disciplining union neither represents nor seeks to represent the
rank-and-file employees, there can be no coercion under section
8(b)(1)(B).
I.

THE DISCIPLINE COMPONENT

Section 8(b)(1)(B) makes it an "unfair labor practice for a labor
organization ... to restrain or coerce... an employer in the selection of his representatives for the purposes of collective bargaining or
the adjustment of grievances.""' Early Board decisions limited section
15. Frequently, provisions in a union constitution prohibit members from accepting a position with a nonunion employer. The issue of coercion arises when a
union disciplines a supervisor-member for breach of such a provision. E.g., NLRB v.
IBEW, Local 323, 703 F.2d 501, 502 & n.1 (11th Cir.), cert. denied, 104 S. Ct. 366
(1983); NLRB v. IBEW, Local 73, 621 F.2d 1035, 1036 (9th Cir.), modified on other
grounds, 714 F.2d 870 (9th Cir. 1980). See infra note 24.
16. IBEW, Local 323, 255 N.L.R.B. 1395, 1397, 1401 (1981), enforced, 703
F.2d 501 (11th Cir.), cert.denied, 104 S. Ct. 366 (1983); IBEW, Local 73, 231
N.L.R.B. 809, 809, 811 (1977), enforcement denied, 621 F.2d 1035 (9th Cir.),
modified on other grounds, 714 F.2d 870 (9th Cir. 1980).
17. See infra notes 84-85 and accompanying text.
18. Compare NLRB v. IBEW, Local 323, 703 F.2d 501, 505-06 (11th Cir.)
(discipline prohibited even though union neither represents nor seeks to represent
rank-and-file), cert. denied, 104 S.Ct. 366 (1983) with NLRB v. IBEW, Local 73,
621 F.2d 1035, 1037 (9th Cir.) (discipline not coercive if union neither represents nor
seeks to represent rank-and-file), modified on other grounds, 714 F.2d 870 (9th Cir.
1980).
19. 29 U.S.C. § 158(b)(1)(B) (1976).
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8(b)(1)(B)'s application to instances of direct union coercion of the
employer in the selection of its collective bargaining or grievance
adjustment representatives.2 0 Thus, a union violated the section when
2
it struck to compel the employer to remove its bargaining agent. '
This provision has since been interpreted to prohibit union discipline of supervisor-members who are performing tasks related to the
collective bargaining or grievance adjustment process.22 Undeniably,23
the punitive nature of discipline can render it a coercive device.
Questions arise, however, as to which supervisory tasks are sufficiently
related to collective bargaining or grievance adjustment to warrant
immunity from discipline.2 4
In San Francisco-OaklandMailers' Union 18,25 the Board first recognized that union pressure need not be directed at an employer to
constitute unlawful coercion.2 6 Indirect coercion, intended to change
the attitude of the employer's representative to one more favorable to
the union, is as effective as replacing the representative. 27 Accordingly, pressure exerted on that representative may be sufficient to
8
2
violate the Act.

Oakland Mailers involved supervisor-members who were disciplined for interpreting the collective bargaining agreement in ways
the union considered contrary to its interests.2 9 Later decisions,
spawned by Oakland Mailers, forbade discipline for the performance
of any supervisory duties, provided the supervisor possessed the authority to bargain collectively or adjust grievances. 30 It was feared
20. E.g., Southern Cal. Pipe Trades Dist. Council 16, 120 N.L.R.B. 249, 250-51
(1958); In re Int'l Typographical Union & Baltimore Typographical Union 12, 87
N.L.R.B. 1215, 1217 (1949); see R. Gorman, supra note 4, at 690-91.
21. Los Angeles Cloak Joint Bd., 127 N.L.R.B. 1543, 1550-51 (1960); see R.
Gorman, supra note 4, at 690-91. A union did not violate the section, however, when
it struck to compel reinstatement of a supervisor who was not a collective bargaining
or grievance adjustment representative. NLRB v. Puerto Rico Rayon Mills, Inc., 293
F.2d 941, 947 (1st Cir. 1961).
22. See infra notes 25-33 and accompanying text.
23. See Florida Power & Light Co. v. IBEW, Local 641, 417 U.S. 790, 804-05
(1974); San Francisco-Oakland Mailers' Union 18, 172 N.L.R.B. 2173, 2174 (1968);
R. Gorman, supra note 4, at 691.
24. The discipline must relate to the supervisor-member's performance of collective bargaining or grievance adjustment duties. See infra notes 37, 43 and accompanying text. Discipline for matters of purely internal union administration, such as
nonpayment of dues, is not coercive. See Local 453, Bhd. of Painters, 183 N.L.R.B.
187, 189 (1970); R. Gorman, supra note 4, at 692. See infra notes 61, 64.
25. 172 N.L.R.B. 2173 (1968).
26. Id. at 2173.

27. Id.
28. Id.
29. Id.
30. E.g., New Mexico Dist. Council of Carpenters, 177 N.L.R.B. 500, 502 (1969)
(supervisor-member with collective bargaining authority disciplined for working
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that such discipline would carry over to the supervisor's collective
bargaining or grievance adjustment activities. 31 Ultimately, the Board
reasoned that any supervisor with substantial supervisory authority,
regardless of whether he was empowered to perform collective bar-

gaining or grievance adjustment functions, might at some future time

become enmeshed in the process. 32 Thus, the section was construed to
prohibit discipline of such supervisors, without concern for whether
33
they possessed collective bargaining or grievance adjustment power.
The Supreme Court's first review of section 8(b)(1)(B) came in
FloridaPower & Light Co. v. IBEW, Local 64134 in which the Court
struck a severe blow to the progeny of Oakland Mailers. The Board
had held that union discipline of supervisor-members who perform
rank-and-file work during a strike falls within the proscriptions of
section 8(b)(1)(B) . 35 The Court disagreed, reasoning that Congress
intended to protect employers only in the selection of representatives
for the purposes of collective bargaining and grievance adjustment. 36

Thus, no violation occurs unless the disciplined conduct is directly
related to the collective bargaining or grievance adjustment function.3 7 Although the Court accorded tacit approval to the Board's

with nonunion employer), enforced, 454 F.2d 1116 (10th Cir. 1972); Toledo Locals
15-P & 272 of the Lithographers & Photoengravers Int'l Union, 175 N.L.R.B. 1072,
1078 (1969) (supervisor-member with collective bargaining authority disciplined for
working with undermanned crew), enforced, 437 F.2d 55 (6th Cir. 1971); see Detroit
Newspaper Printing Pressmen's Union 13, 192 N.L.R.B. 106, 111 (1971); Union
Discipline, supra note 4, at 461.
31. See NLRB v. Toledo Locals 15-P & 272 of the Lithographers & Photoengravers Int'l Union, 437 F.2d 55, 57 (6th Cir. 1971); Local 453, Bhd. of Painters, 183
N.L.R.B. 187, 188-89 (1970).
32. Local 2150, IBEW, 192 N.L.R.B. 77, 80 (1971) (quoting Toledo Locals 15-P
& 272 of the Lithographers & Photoengravers Int'l Union, 175 N.L.R.B. 1072, 1079
(1969), enforced, 437 F.2d 55 (6th Cir. 1971)), enforced, 486 F.2d 602 (7th Cir.
1973), vacated and remanded, 418 U.S. 902 (1974); Houston Typographical Union
87, 182 N.L.R.B. 592, 595 (1970) (dictum); Toledo Locals 15-P & 272 of the
Lithographers & Photoengravers Int'l Union, 175 N.L.R.B. 1072, 1079 (1969) (dictum), enforced, 437 F.2d 55 (6th Cir. 1971); see R. Gorman, supra note 4, at 692.
33. See Florida Power & Light Co. v. IBEW, Local 641, 417 U.S. 790, 802
(1974); Meat Cutters Union 81 v. NLRB, 458 F.2d 794, 798-99 (D.C. Cir. 1972):
ChangingInterpretation,supra note 7, at 122-23; Union Discipline, supra note 4, at
461-62.
34. 417 U.S. 790 (1974).
35. IBEW Sys. Council U-4, 193 N.L.R.B. 30, 31 (1971), enforced sub nom.
IBEW, Local 134 v. NLRB, 487 F.2d 1113 (1972), rev'd en banc, 487 F.2d 1143
(D.C. Cir. 1973), aff'd sub nom. Florida Power & Light Co. v. IBEW, Local 641,
417 U.S. 790 (1974); IBEW, Local 134, 192 N.L.R.B. 85, 86 (1971), enforced, 487
F.2d 1113 (1972), rev'd en banc, 487 F.2d 1143 (D.C. Cir. 1973), aff'd sub nora.
Florida Power & Light Co. v. IBEW, Local 641, 417 U.S. 790 (1974).
36. FloridaPower, 417 U.S. at 804.
37. Id. at 804-05; accord NLRB v. Amax Coal Co., 453 U.S. 322, 349 (1981)
(Stevens, J., dissenting).
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Oakland Mailers decision,3 it cast grave doubt on the validity of the
post-Oakland Mailers extensions. 3 9
The Court again encountered section 8(b)(1)(B) in ABC v. Writers

Guild.40 In this case the Board held, 4' and the Court agreed, that

union discipline of supervisor-members who cross a picket line to
perform only supervisory duties, including the adjustment of grievances, contravenes section 8(b) (1)(B) . 42 Writers Guild revitalized
those Board decisions premised on the principle that discipline for the
performance of general supervisory duties is forbidden if such discipline may carry over to the supervisor's performance of collective
43
bargaining or grievance adjustment tasks.
Writers Guild leaves open the question whether discipline violates
the Act when the supervisor lacks authority to bargain collectively or
adjust grievances." Nonetheless, it is clear that a union may discipline
a supervisor-member for performing only rank-and-file work during a
strike without coercing the employer. 45 Union discipline becomes coercive when it interferes with the employer's ability to bargain and
resolve contract disputes.

38. Id. at 805.
39. See infra note 43.
40. 437 U.S. 411 (1978).
41. Writers Guild, 217 N.L.R.B. 957, 969 (1975), enforcement denied per curiam, 547 F.2d 159 (2d Cir. 1976), rev'd, 437 U.S. 411 (1978).
42. Writers Guild, 437 U.S. at 429-30. The Court seemingly based its conclusion
on the standards enunciated in FloridaPower, id. at 429, and the result is technically
in accord with the holding of that case. Compare Writers Guild, 437 U.S. at 429-30
(discipline of supervisor-members who cross picket line to perform only supervisory
duties, including the adjustment of grievances, contravenes § 8(b)(1)(B)) with Florida Power & Light Co. v. IBEW, Local 641, 417 U.S. 790, 805 & n.16 (1974)(discipline of supervisor-members who cross picket line to perform only rank-and-file work
is not coercive).
43. See Writers Guild, 437 U.S. at 429. Writers Guild's analysis of FloridaPower
is somewhat questionable. The Court inferred that Florida Power embraced the
"carryover" rationale of post-OaklandMailers decisions. Id. This was the notion
that
discipline of a supervisor, for the performance of general supervisory duties, is
prohibited if such disipline may carry over to the performance of collective bargaining or grievance adjustment tasks. See supra notes 30-31 and accompanying text.
Florida Power, however, indicated that Oakland Mailers "fell within the outer
limits" of the test for a violation. 417 U.S. at 805 (emphasis added); accord Writers
Guild, 437 U.S. at 442 n.5 (Stewart, J., dissenting). Thus, to find that FloridaPower
endorsed extensions of Oakland Mailers is contrary to the language of FloridaPower.
Yet, Writers Guild apparently intends a return to many of the pre-FloridaPower
precepts. See Union Discipline,supra note 4, at 471.
44. See Local 926, Int'l Union of Operating Eng'rs v. Jones, 103 S. Ct. 1453,
1460 n.10 (1983). The "carryover" rationale may extend to cases where the supervisor
lacks authority to bargain collectively or adjust grievances. See id.
45. Florida Power & Light Co. v. IBEW, Local 641, 417 U.S. 790, 805 (1974);
see R. Gorman, supra note 4, at 693.
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THE RELATIONSHIP COMPONENT

Once it is determined that there has been discipline sufficient to
constitute coercion, it must be established that the discipline has
provided the union with some measure of control over the employer's
ability to bargain collectively or adjust grievances. In Oakland Mailers, the Board acknowledged that discipline violates the Act when
such discipline is imposed to change the employer's foremen "from
persons representing the viewpoint of management to persons responsive or subservient to [the union's] will. '46 The legislative history of
section 8(b)(1)(B) indicates that Congress was concerned primarily
with preventing unions from exercising such control. 47 The section
was intended to prohibit unions from coercing employers into choosing bargaining representatives or grievance adjusters favorable to the
union. 4 Senator Taft explained the provision as follows:
[E]mployees cannot say to their employer, "We do not like Mr. X,
we will not meet Mr. X. You have to send us Mr. Y.". . . It would
prevent their saying to the employer, "You have to fire Foreman
Jones. We do not like Foreman Jones, and therefore you have to
fire him, or we will not go to work." . . . Under the bill the
employer has a right to say, "No . . .[h]ere49is my representative,

and this is the man you have to deal with."

In FloridaPower, the Supreme Court recognized that Congress, in
enacting section 8(b) (1) (B), was "exclusively concerned with union
attempts to dictate to employers who would represent them in collective bargaining and grievance adjustment. "50 After laying this founda-

46. San Francisco-Oakland Mailers' Union 18, 172 N.L.R.B. 2173, 2173 (1968).
47. "It often happens that management is forced to replace a foreman because
the union does not like him-because he is too strict. Cases of that nature are very
numerous.... The bill outlaws such conduct." 93 Cong. Rec. 4137 (1947) (remarks
of Sen. Ellender); see Florida Power & Light Co. v. IBEW, Local 641, 417 U.S. 790,
804-05 (1974); 93 Cong. Rec. 4143 (1947) (remarks of Sen. Ellender). Oakland
Mailersrecognized that union pressure to replace a foreman may be the equivalent of
union control over the foreman. 172 N.L.R.B. at 2173.
48. S.Rep. No. 105, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. 21 (1947) [hereinafter cited as Senate
Report], reprinted in 1 NLRB, Legislative History of the Labor Management Relations Act, 1947, at 427 (1948) [hereinafter cited as Legislative History]. The section
was also designed to prevent unions from compelling employers to either join or
resign from employer associations that negotiate labor contracts for their members.
Id., reprinted in Legislative History, supra, at 427.
49. 93 Cong. Rec. 3837 (1947) (remarks of Sen. Taft). Senator Taft was the
principal sponsor of the measure; accordingly, his interpretation is entitled to great
deference. See North Haven Bd. of Educ. v. Bell, 456 U.S. 512, 526-27 (1982); FEA
v. Algonquin SNG, Inc., 426 U.S. 548, 564 (1976); National Woodwork Mfrs. Ass'n
v. NLRB, 386 U.S. 612, 640 (1967); 2A C. Sands, Sutherland Statutory Construction
§ 48.15, at 221-22 (4th ed. 1973).
50. Florida Power & Light Co. v. IBEW, Local 641, 417 U.S. 790, 803 (1974).
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tion, the Court determined that union discipline of supervisor-members can constitute a violation of section 8(b)(1)(B) only when the
discipline may "adversely affect" the supervisor's performance of his
collective bargaining or grievance adjustment duties.5 ' Indeed, if it is
the exclusive purpose of section 8(b)(1)(B) to prohibit a union's determination of the employer's bargaining representative, an adverse effect on the supervisor's performance of his duties is necessarily one
that will enable a union to dictate its choice of 52representative or
unduly influence the attitude of the representative.
FloridaPower and Writers Guild were decided in the context of a
bargaining relationship between an employer and a union. 53 Writers
Guild did not disturb the underpinnings of FloridaPower that require
a control factor on which to premise a claim of coercion. 54 Writers
Guild simply placed greater restrictions on permissible union discipline of supervisor-members when the union is already in a position to
obtain some
control through its bargaining relationship with the em55
ployer.
OaklandMailers, which was approved by the Court in both Florida
Power6 and Writers Guild,57 illustrates the significance of a relationship as the conduit for control. In articulating the concept of indirect
coercion, the Board reasoned that discipline of the employer's representative can change that representative's attitude toward the union.-s
Although causing a change in the supervisor's attitude may be as
effective as replacing the representative, 59 this attitude is not impor51. Id. at 804-05.
52. See infra notes 58-61 and accompanying text.
53. Writers Guild, 437 U.S. at 413-14; FloridaPower, 417 U.S. at 792, 794-95.
54. The Court indicated that it was the control factor, derived from the unionmanagement relationship, that rendered the discipline coercive: "At the same time,
[the supervisors] were expected to perform their regular supervisory duties and to
adjust grievances whenever the occasion demanded, functions requiring them to deal
with the same union which was considering the appeal of their personal sanctions."
Writers Guild, 437 U.S. at 434 (emphasis added).
55. See id. at 429-30. FloridaPower's language indicating that an adverse effect
on the supervisor's performance will only be coercive when the disciplined conduct
relates directly to the collective bargaining or grievance adjustment process is dictum. See FloridaPower, 417 U.S. at 804-05; NLRB v. Amax Coal Co., 453 U.S. 322,
349-50 (1981) (Stevens, J., dissenting). Writers Guild merely diluted this dictum by
expanding the category of supervisory duties insulated from discipline. See Writers
Guild, 437 U.S. at 429-30; Union Discipline, supra note 4, at 471. This is consistent
with the fundamental requirement, established in FloridaPower, that there be an
adverse effect that enables a union to dictate effectively its choice of employer
representative. See NLRB v. Amax Coal Co., 453 U.S. 322, 334-35 (1981); Writers
Guild, 437 U.S. at 422-23, 429.
56. See 417 U.S. at 805.
57. 437 U.S. at 436.
58. San Francisco-Oakland Mailers' Union 18, 172 N.L.R.B. 2173, 2173 (1968).
59. Id.
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tant unless the employer is engaged in dealings with the union. In
Oakland Mailers, for example, the representative was charged with
the responsibility of interpreting the agreement between the employer
and the union.6 0 Absent such a union-management relationship, however, any attitudinal changes will not enhance a union's control over
the collective bargaining or grievance adjustment process. 6'
The union-management relationship in New Mexico District Council of Carpenters (A.S. Homer, Inc.) 62 represents the minimum relationship sufficient to allow a finding of coercion. Although there was
no established bargaining relationship, the union had twice, prior to
the disciplinary action, lost elections to represent the rank-and-file
employees.6 3 The Board acknowledged that this relationship was
ade4
quate to inject coercion into the union's disciplinary action.

60. Id.
61. In Oakland Mailers, the Board rejected the union's contention that the
discipline was permitted as a purely internal union measure. Id. at 2174. The Board
found that the relationship between the union and its members was "used as a
convenient and . . . powerful tool to affect the employer-union relationship." Id.
Later decisions also recognized that § 8(b)(1)(B) violations require that the underlying dispute be between the employer and union and not between the union and its
members. Wisconsin River Valley Dist. Council, 218 N.L.R.B. 1063, 1066 (1975)
(dissent of Member Penello), enforced, 532 F.2d 47 (7th Cir. 1976); United Bhd. of
Carpenters & Joiners Union 14, 217 N.L.R.B. 202, 202, 206 (1975); Newspaper
Guild, Local 187, 196 N.L.R.B. 1121, 1122 (1972), enforcement denied, 489 F.2d
416 (3d Cir. 1973); Local 2150, IBEW, 192 N.L.R.B. 77, 81 (1971), enforced, 486
F.2d 602 (7th Cir. 1973), vacated and remanded on other grounds, 418 U.S. 902
(1974); New Mexico Dist. Council of Carpenters, 177 N.L.R.B. 500, 502 (1969),
enforced, 454 F.2d 1116 (10th Cir. 1972); see NLRB v. Amax Coal Co., 453 U.S.
322, 350 (1981) (Stevens, J., dissenting); NLRB v. IBEW, Local 73, 621 F.2d 1035,
1037 (9th Cir.), modified on other grounds, 714 F.2d 870 (9th Cir. 1980); NLRB v.
Sheet Metal Workers' Int'l Ass'n, Local 361, 477 F.2d 675, 677 (5th Cir. 1973); Meat
Cutters Union 81 v. NLRB, 458 F.2d 794, 800-01 (D.C. Cir. 1972); R. Gorman,
supra note 4, at 692; cf. NLRB v. Allis-Chalmers Mfg. Co., 388 U.S. 175, 187 (1967)
(§ 8(b)(1)(A) not intended to regulate internal union affairs with respect to union
discipline of nonsupervisory members).
62. 177 N.L.R.B. 500 (1969), enforced, 454 F.2d 1116 (10th Cir. 1972).
63. Id. at 501. In Homer, the union clearly had a continuing interest in representing the rank-and-file workers of the supervisor-member's employer. See id. The
union had petitioned for representation elections in two consecutive years, waiting
only the minimum statutory time between elections. See 29 U.S.C. § 159(c)(3)
(1976). At some point after the union loses an election, however, its interest in
representing the rank-and-file can no longer be presumed from prior election petitions; the union-management relationship underlying a § 8(b)(1)(B) claim will no
longer exist.
64. See Homer, 177 N.L.R.B. at 502 (underlying dispute was between union and
employer rather than between union and its members); see also Painters Dist. Council 36, 259 N.L.R.B. 808, 808 (1981) (union's interest in representing rank-and-file
distinguished from lack of interest); Wisconsin River Valley Dist. Council, 218
N.L.R.B. 1063, 1066 (1975) (dissent of Member Penello) (relationship crucial to
determining the existence of a violation), enforced, 532 F.2d 47 (7th Cir. 1976).
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Clearly, union discipline of supervisor-members, who have collective bargaining or grievance adjustment authority, may result in coercion of the employer when the union represents 65 or seeks to represent
the rank-and-file employees . 6 Under these circumstances, a union
may use discipline to compel the resignation of a supervisor in order to
avoid dealing with an undesirable representative. 7 Alternatively,
such discipline may be used to effect a change in the representative's
attitude toward the union, thereby accomplishing a similiar result.68
In either case, the union's conduct amounts to choosing the employer's
representative.
There is no such coercion, however, when a union is neither engaged in a bargaining relationship with an employer nor exhibits an
interest in becoming so engaged. In this situation, the discipline can
effectuate no choice of bargaining representative. 6 9 Therefore, the
70
required adverse effect on the supervisor's performance cannot exist.

When a union neither represents nor seeks to represent the rank-and-file employees,
there is no dispute between the employer and union. Accordingly, any discipline
must be considered a purely internal union affair and, therefore, not coercive. See
Local 453, Bhd. of Painters, 183 N.L.R.B. 187, 189 (1970). See supra note 61 and
accompanying text. Although unions have no statutory right to discipline supervisormembers, even for purely internal matters, there is no basis to prohibit such discipline under § 8(b)(1)(B). See Florida Power & Light Co. v. IBEW, Local 641, 417
U.S. 790, 805 n.16 (1974).
65. See ABC v. Writers Guild, 437 U.S. 411, 429 (1978); Florida Power & Light
Co. v. IBEW, Local 641, 417 U.S. 790, 804-05 (1974); San Francisco-Oakland
Mailers' Union 18, 172 N.L.R.B. 2173, 2173 (1968); R. Gorman, supra riote 4, at
691-93.
66. See New Mexico Dist. Council of Carpenters, 177 N.L.R.B. 500, 501 (1969),
enforced, 454 F.2d 1116 (10th Cir. 1972).
67. See ABC v. Writers Guild, 437 U.S. 411, 435 (1978); Dallas Mailers Union,
Local 143 v. NLRB, 445 F.2d 730, 734 (D.C. Cir. 1971); Painters Dist. Council 36,
259 N.L.R.B. 808, 811 (1981).
68. See supra notes 58-64 and, accompanying text.
69. This analysis comports with the Board's position that a violation of
§ 8(b) (1)(B) is dependent not on the union's motivation for discipline, but on whether
the discipline will have the reasonable effect of coercing the employer in the selection
of its collective bargaining or grievance adjustment representative. See Painters Dist.
Council 36, 259 N.L.R.B. 808, 811 (1981); Chicago Typographical Union 16, 216
N.L.R.B. 903, 903-04 (1975), enforced, 539 F.2d 242 (D.C. Cir. 1976).
70. Rules forbidding members from working for nonunion employers are typically justified by the union's need to prevent its members from aiding employers
opposed to the cause of unionism. See IBEW, Local 323, 255 N.L.R.B. 1395, 1397
(1981), enforced, 703 F.2d 501 (11th Cir.), cert. denied, 104 S. Ct. 366 (1983); New
Mexico Dist. Council of Carpenters, 177 N.L.R.B. 500, 502 (1969), enforced, 454
F.2d 1116 (10th Cir. 1972). Absent an adverse effect on the collective bargaining
process, however, the enforcement of these rules is not coercive even if they are used
to influence employers' views of unionism. See supra notes 50-52 and accompanying
text.
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III. DIVIDED LOYALTIES AND THE LIMITED SCOPE OF SECTION 8(b)(1)(B)
The purpose of section 8(b)(1)(B) militates against finding a violation when there has been a failure to establish some form of unionmanagement relationship. 7 ' Absent this relationship, barring union
discipline of supervisor-members simply ensures for the employer the
absolute loyalty of its supervisors. 72 Section 8(b)(1)(B), however, was
never intended to guarantee undivided loyalty. 73 The section was
designed to prevent unions from compelling employers to choose pro74
union collective bargaining or grievance adjustment representatives.
The 1947 Taft-Hartley Act7 s enunciates a national labor policy
intended to foster the development of supervisors "loyal to [management and] not subject to influence or control of unions.17 6 Section
2(3), for example, expressly defines "employee" to exclude supervisors
from the protection of the Act. 77 Similiarly, section 14(a) 78 permits

71. See supra text accompanying notes 46-70.
72. See Florida Power & Light Co. v. IBEW, Local 641, 417 U.S. 790, 805-07
(1974).
73. See text accompanying infra notes 81-82.
74. See supra notes 48-50 and accompanying text.
75. Ch. 120, 61 Stat. 136 (1947) (codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. §§ 141-97
(1976)). The Wagner Act of 1935 was the first promulgation of the National Labor
Relations Act. Ch. 372, 49 Stat. 449 (1935) (codified as amended at 29 U.S.C.
§§ 151-69 (1976)). Several of the Taft-Hartley amendments were enacted to clarify
Congressional intent with respect to the status of supervisors under the Act. The
Wagner Act had defined "employer" as "any person acting in the interest of an
employer." Ch. 372, § 2(2), 49 Stat. 449, 450 (1935); see H.R. Rep. No. 245, 80th
Cong., 1st Sess. 13 (1947) [hereinafter cited as House Report], reprintedin Legislative History, supra note 48, at 304. Board decisions over the next ten years, however,
included supervisors within the class of statutory employees. Under this rationale, the
Board began certifying unions of foremen. E.g., In re Packard Motor Car Co., 61
N.L.R.B. 4, 15, 17 (1945), enforced, 157 F.2d 80 (6th Cir. 1946), afj'd, 330 U.S. 485
(1947); In re Godchaux Sugars, Inc., 44 N.L.R.B. 874, 876-77 (1942), overruled, In
re Maryland Dry Dock Co., 49 N.L.R.B. 733 (1943), overruled, In re Packard Motor
Car Co., 61 N.L.R.B. 4 (1945), enforced, 157 F.2d 80 (6th Cir. 1946), aff'd, 330
U.S. 485 (1947); In re Union Collieries Coal Co., 41 N.L.R.B. 961, 965-67 (1942);
see House Report, supra, at 13, reprinted in Legislative History, supra note 48, at
304. In response, Congress amended § 2(3) of the Act and enacted §§ 2(11) and 14(a).
See Ch.120, § 101, 61 Stat. 136, 137-38, 151 (1947) (codified at 29 U.S.C. §§ 152(3),
(11), 164(a) (1976)). See infra notes 77-80 and accompanying text. These sections
apply not only to unions of supervisors, but also to rank-and-file unions that have
supervisor-members. House Report, supra, at 15, reprinted in Legislative History,
supra note 48, at 306.
76. House Report, supra note 75, at 16, reprintedin Legislative History, supra
note 48, at 307; accord Beasley v. Food Fair of N.C., Inc., 416 U.S. 653, 661-62
(1974).
77. 29 U.S.C. § 152(3) (1976); see also 29 U.S.C. § 152(11) (1976) (defining
"supervisor").
78. 29 U.S.C. § 164(a) (1976). Section 14(a) provides:
Nothing herein shall prohibit any individual employed as a supervisor from

1984]

UNION DISCIPLINE

1169

supervisors to retain union membership, but relieves "employers ...
from any compulsion ... to accord [supervisors] the anomalous status
of employees. '7 The primary purpose of these sections is to provide
management with the "undivided loyalty" of its supervisors.80
FloridaPower, however, rejected the notion that section 8(b)(1)(B)
was designed to provide an employer with such loyalty."' The Court
ruled that Congress intended sections 2(3) and 14(a) to be the exclusive means to resolve the loyalty problem.8 2 Any employer desiring the
absolute loyalty of its supervisors can insist that they resign their union
s3
membership.
Implicit in this conclusion is the possibility that a supervisor may
prefer union membership to his position. The Court's willingness to
risk this resignation indicates that a resignation alone is not conclusive
evidence of union coercion. Yet, the Board has ruled that the employer is coerced within the meaning of section 8(b)(1)(B) when the
supervisor can only avoid discipline by resigning from his position.8 4

becoming or remaining a member of a labor organization, but no employer
subject to this [Act] shall be compelled to deem individuals defined herein as
supervisors as employees for the purpose of any law, either national or local,
relating to collective bargaining.

Id.
79. Senate Report, supra note 48, at 5, reprinted in Legislative History, supra
note 48, at 411; see Florida Power & Light Co. v. IBEW, Local 641, 417 U.S. 790,
810 n.19 (1974).
80. Senate Report, supra note 48, at 5, reprinted in Legislative History, supra
note 48, at 411.
81. Florida Power & Light v. IBEW, Local 641, 417 U.S. 790, 807 (1974).
82. Id. at 807-08.
83. Id. at 812. There is, of course, a loyalty aspect to the § 8(b)(1)(B) problem.
The Oakland Mailers formulation of indirect coercion was premised on a union's
ability to use discipline to change the supervisor-member's attitude toward the union.
172 N.L.R.B. at 2173. Essentially, a change in attitude represents a diversion of the
supervisor-member's loyalty away from the employer and toward the union. See id.
Yet, influencing the supervisor-member's loyalty does not alone constitute coercion.
See Florida Power & Light Co. v. IBEW, Local 641, 417 U.S. 790, 813 (1974); Union
Discipline, supra note 4, at 464. The supervisor-member's loyalty is merely the
vehicle by which the union may adversely affect the employer's ability to bargain
collectively or adjust grievances. See ABC v. Writers Guild, 437 U.S. 411, 436-37
(1978). Absent such an adverse effect, § 8(b)(1)(B) cannot be applied to guard against
divided loyalties. See Florida Power & Light Co. v. IBEW, Local 641, 417 U.S. 790,
807 (1974); Union Discipline, supra note 4, at 463.
84. IBEW, Local 323, 255 N.L.R.B. 1395, 1401 (1981), enforced, 703 F.2d 501
(11th Cir.), cert. denied, 104 S.Ct. 366 (1983); IBEW, Local 73, 231 N.L.R.B. 809,
811 (1977), enforcement denied, 621 F.2d 1035 (9th Cir.), modified on other
grounds, 714 F.2d 870 (9th Cir. 1980).
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Should the supervisor choose allegiance to the union, the employer
would be deprived of its bargaining representative.8 5
This analysis, however, obscures the issue. The critical inquiry must
focus on whether the resignation could adversely influence the grievance adjustment or collective bargaining process. Although the discipline component of coercion may be present, there can be no such
influence when a union neither represents nor seeks to represent the
rank-and-file. Section 8(b)(1)(B) must not be applied solely to bolster
a supervisor's allegiance to his employer. Thus, failure to establish a
sufficient union-management relationship should be fatal to a claim of
union coercion.
CONCLUSION

Two components are necessary to establish a claim of coercion
under section 8(b)(1)(B). Discipline must have been imposed for the
supervisor's performance of duties related to the collective bargaining
or grievance adjustment process. Once a union has so disciplined a
supervisor-member, it must be determined that the discipline will
enhance the union's control over either of the two processes. When
there is a bargaining relationship between the employer and union,
such control may be presumed. When there is no such relationship,
however, there must be a showing that some other form of unionmanagement relationship exists. This necessary relationship is not
present when a union neither represents nor displays an interest in
representing the rank-and-file employees. As a result, there is no
coercion within the meaning of section 8(b)(1)(B).
The Board's approach to this issue is problematic because it affords
employers the protection of the Act when it is neither warranted nor
permitted. This application of section 8(b)(1)(B) serves the forbidden
purpose of ensuring for these employers the absolute loyalty of their
supervisors. In addition, many unions provide their members with
substantial benefits. To allow section 8(b)(1)(B) to shelter supervisors
from discipline when protection is unnecessary enables these supervisors to avoid their responsibilities as union members while they continue to reap the rewards of their affiliation with the union.
Andrew M. Calamari

85. IBEW, Local 323, 255 N.L.R.B. 1395, 1401 (1981), enforced, 703 F.2d 501
(11th Cir.), cert. denied, 104 S. Ct. 366 (1983); IBEW, Local 73, 231 N.L.R.B. 809,
811 (1977), enforcement denied, 621 F.2d 1035 (9th Cir.), modified on other
grounds, 714 F.2d 870 (9th Cir. 1980).

